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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

:

JOHNNY WADE DRAWN,

:

Case N6. 890253-CA

Categoty No. 2

Defendant-Defendant. :

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction for aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 76-6-302 (1978).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989),
as the appeal was transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme
Court on May 2, 1989.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUSES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies are included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED QN APPEAL
1.

Whether defendant's voluntary confession to

committing the aggravated robbery obviates the need of this Court
to address Points I and II of defendant's argument on appeal.
2.

Whether the trial court properly denied defendant's

motion to exclude the in-court identification of defendant by
Micki Horn.

3.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by

finding that the State had made sufficient effort to compel the
attendance of subpoenaed witnesses Rosemary Mar and Genora
Marcellus, and by admitting their statements under Rule 804(b) of
the Utah Rules of Evidence.
4.

Whether the imposition of a five year sentence for

use of a firearm during the commission of felony, in addition to
the sentence given defendant upon his conviction of aggravated
robbery, constituted double jeopardy.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Johnny Wade Drawn, was charged with
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 6-7).
Defendant was convicted as charged on January 13, 1989,
following a jury trial, in the Third Judicial District Court, in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David S.
Young, Judge, presiding (R. at 109). Defendant was sentenced by
Judge Young on February 10, 1989, to five years to life at the
Utah State Penitentiary, to be served consecutively with the
sentences he was currently serving and with an additional fiveyear firearm enhancement (R. at 114-15).
A notice of appeal was filed on March 9, 1989 (R. at
116-17).

On May 2, 1989, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the

case to this Court for disposition.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 21, 1988, Micki Horn and Julie Lund were
working at the Payless Shoe Source (hereinafter "shoe store"),

located at 3500 South 5710 West in Magna, Utah, when a black
male, later identified as defendant, entered the store (R. 129 at
52, 74). Defendant was wearing a mask consisting of beige and
pink nylon stockings and carrying a sawed-off shotgun (R. 129 at
52, 54, 74, 76, 87).
Defendant first approached Micki Horn and, pointing the
shotgun at her, walked her to the counter, telling her "just open
the register and give me all the money" (R. 129 at 52). As Horn
was opening the register, defendant said, "I swear if you set off
the alarm I'm going to blow you in half" (R. 129 at 53). Horn
testified that during this time she was able to closely observe
defendant, "looking right at his face the whole time".

This

allowed her to positively identify him at trial (R. 129 at 55,
57).

Defendant was wearing baggy "khaki p^nts" and a long

sleeved shirt (R. 129 at 63). Horn removed the money from the
till and handed it to defendant (R. 129 at 54).
A second employee, Julie Lund, had observed defendant
enter the store and order Horn to remove the money (R. 129 at
74).

Defendant ordered Lund to get on the floor behind the

register and open a safe (R. 129 at 53, 75). Lund complied and

In court, Ms. Horn identified the defendant as follows:
Well, when I walked in I sat down and he
turned around and it hit me like h ton of
bricks. I recognized him. And tnat was it.
And everything about him—the features—I
just . . . it was him. I just couldn't—I
don't know. But I recognized him. The way
he moved, the way his back was ovfer, the
wrinkles on the forehead, his nose,
everything.
(R. 129 at 57-58).

removed a Valley Bank deposit bag and loose cash (R. 129 at 53,
75-76).

Defendant placed the money bag and cash in an "acid wash

jean bag" (R. 129 at 76). While Lund was on the floor, two
customers entered the store (R. 129 at 55, 75, 77). Defendant
told Horn to get rid of them (R. 129 at 55). As she was doing
so, defendant retrieved the money and fled the store (R. 129 at
58, 76). As defendant was leaving, Lund observed him remove the
nylon stocking mask (R. 129 at 76).
As defendant fled, he was observed by Nanci Condi who
was in her car just outside the shoe store (R. 129 at 86). Condi
testified that defendant was wearing something pink on his head,
and "frantically" placing something in the "darker color[ed]" bag
he was carrying (R. 129 at 87, 90). As defendant ran, he removed
the pink and beige nylon mask and proceeded through a field
between the shoe store and a nearby Albertsons.

Then he jumped

into a "little white stationwagon car" driven by a black woman
(R. 129 at 87-89).
Condi entered the shoe store and inquired whether there
had been a robbery.

She spoke on the phone with the police about

what she had seen, giving a description of the car, the driver,
and the direction that the vehicle was moving (R. 129 at 88-89).
Condi also told police that the robber was a black male wearing
"baggy khaki colored pants and a white sweatshirt" (R. 129 at 8990).
Officer Kory Newbold of the West Valley Police
Department was on his way to investigate the robbery when he saw
a "smaller compact white stationwagon" with three occupants, whom

he thought were Hispanic (R. 115, 117, 129). The dispatch report
indicated that the store had been robbed by a male Hispanic (R.
129 at 116). After observing the vehicle ahd its occupants,
Officer Newbold turned on his "emergency overheads" (R. 129 at
116).

The driver of the white station wagon did not pull over

but continued on, increasing in speed and temporarily eluding
Officer Newbold (R. 129 at 116, 118). After a short time,
Officer Newbold again spotted the white station wagon and
subsequently stopped the car which then contained only two women
(R. 129 at 117). He ordered the woman drivler to throw the keys
out of the car window, and ordered the two women to place their
hands on the ceiling of the car (R. 129 at 118).
Officer Newbold explained to the driver that he was
attempting to locate a suspect involved in an armed robbery.
When he saw that the occupants of the car were black, he
explained that he was looking for a Hispanic and apologized (R.
129 at 119). Upon returning to his patrol car, Officer Newbold
received updated information from the dispatcher, which indicated
that the suspect was possibly a black male, and identified the
vehicle as a white compact station wagon (R. 129 at 119). The
dispatch also indicated that the robber had placed the money in a
denim bag (R. 129 at 119). Officer Newbold had noticed an open
blue denim bag in the back seat of the automobile so he stopped
the vehicle again.

He handcuffed the occupants of the car,

Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus (R. at 120, 122). Shortly
thereafter, Officer Newbold was approached by Scott Jones (R. 129
at 120-121).

Scott Jones told Officer Newbold that, as he was
driving in the vicinity of the arrest, he saw a black male
wearing pants and a sweatshirt jump out of the white compact
station wagon just moments before it was stopped by the officer
(R. 129 at 107, 120-121). Mr. Jones testified that he pursued the
man for "a while", losing sight of him for about twenty minutes.
When he again spotted the man, he had changed from "khaki"
colored long pants and a long light colored shirt into shorts (R.
129 at 107, 112-113).

In October of 1988, Mr. Jones participated

in a lineup during which he identified a male, other than
defendant, as possibly the individual who had exited the white
station wagon (R. 129 at 109).
Nanci Condi and Julie Lund were driven by police
officer Coy Acocks to the scene of the arrest in order to try to
identify the automobile and, possibly, the suspects (R. 129 at
92).

Lund testified that she recognized "one girl [as] being in

the store earlier" (R. 129 at 79). Condi identified the white
station wagon as the one used in the robbery (R. 129 at 92, 94).
As Officer Acocks was returning the witnesses, he recovered the
shotgun and a bag of money from children who had found them in
the area (R. 129 at 79, 99, 104, 137, 140, 143, 145). Lund
identified the shotgun as the weapon used in the robbery (R. 129
at 80-81).

The money was contained within a "blue denim

whitewash type bag" (R. 129 at 140). Two nylon stockings, one
beige and one pink, were also recovered from the white station
2
During the lineup, Mr. Scott placed the lineup number on
the back of the lineup card, which indicated he was not positive
as to the identification (R. 129 at 56, 62, 109).

wagon (R. 130 at 34, State's exhibit #4).
Detective Ron Edwards of the West Valley Police
Department was called to investigate the robbery (R. 129 at 148).
During the investigation, he interviewed Rosemary Mar and Genora
Marcellus separately (R. 129 at 148). Detective Edwards
testified that, after he read Mar the Miranjda rights, she
voluntarily agreed to speak with him but refused to allow the
interview to be tape recorded (R. 129 at 1419). Mar indicated
that she, Marcellus, and defendant were in the white station
wagon together at approximately 3:00 p.m., when she and Marcellus
exited the car and entered the shoe store (R. 129 at 151).
Unable to find what they wanted, they returned to the car (R. 129
at 151). She said that defendant then exited the car and entered
the store, returning a few minutes later to inform them that he
had robbed the store (R. 130 at 151). Mar indicated that when
they were being pursued by police, she threw the money and
shotgun out the window, and forced defendant from the car (R. 130
at 152).
Detective Edwards testified that he then interviewed
Genora Marcellus, who also refused to allow the interview to be
tape recorded (R. 130 at 153). Genora's version of the events
was basically consistent with that of Mar, with the exception of
where the car was parked prior to the robbery (R. 130 at 154).
Detective Edwards testified that he interviewed
defendant the day after the robbery, August 22, 1988 (R. 130 at
157).

Defendant also refused to allow the interview to be tape

3
recorded (R. 129 at 157).

Officers Scott Carver and Richard

Sullivan were present during the first part of the interview.
Officer Edwards testified:
As I entered the room Mr. Drawn and the two
other officers were there. And Mr. Drawn
stated his innocence at that time but that he
didn't know what he was talking about. He
stated that he had talked to Rosemary from
the jail and that Rosemary told him that some
black guy was running by the Payless Shoes,
waved 'em down and asked to jump—to get in
the car, to drive them away, that some white
boys were chasing him. At which time I
explained to Mr. Drawn I didn't believe his
story and at which time I asked if he had
already had his rights per Miranda given to
him at which time he asked if he could speak
to me alone and have the two other officers
leave the room.
(R. 129 at 158-599).

Carver was defendant's parole officer and

defendant feared that anything he said might affect his parole
(R. 131 at 25). Detective Edwards testified that after Sullivan
and Carver left the room, the following transpired:
After the two other officers left the room I
asked him point blank, did you do the
robbery? He said, what's in it for me? I
said, I can't give you any promises.
Everything's going to have to go through the
county attorney's office. He stated, I don't
want Rosemary charged. I says, I still
cannot give you a guarantee. I said, that's
up to the county attorney's office about
that. He stated, yes, I did it. I said,
will you explain to me how you did it. He
says that they were at his sister's place,
Audrey's on Sunday afternoon. They left the
house in her car. They were going west.
That Rosemary wanted him to do the robbery.
It was his girlfriend. That they went out to
the Payless Shoe on 5600 West and 3500 South*
Detective Edwards testified that during his 14 years as a
police officer "less than 10 percent of the defendants would, or
suspects would, ever want their conversation taped" (R. 130 at
11).

He had the two girls go in to lodk at the
building, the Payless Shoes, how many girls
were there, where the safe was and the
diagram of the place, more or less, at which
time they came out, then he went in and
robbed them.
He stated he had a shotgun, that he put
the mask over his head. He went in there
with the shotgun. He stated at t^hat time it
wasn't loaded, that he didn't warit to hurt
anybody. He said he went in there, had
forced one woman down, he took the other
woman back to the safe and to the till, put
the money in a denim bag and ran out.
He said he got in the car; they took
off. As he went down one of the streets they
said a West Valley officer turned around on
'em; they tried to evade him. He jumped out
at that time.
He says that Rosemary threw the gun and
the money out of the car. He werit into the
bushes in a field, did a semi circle and
watched the officers there from across the
street in the weeds.
After the vehicle was impounded and
everybody left he then started to hitchhike.
A gentleman in an older pickup picked him up,
he was home — well, he was with his sister,
Audrey, at the time when I called Audrey
about 8:00 o'clock on the night before, that
he was at his sister's residence.
(R. 129 at 159-160).
Officer Scott Carver testified that he was present when
the interrogation of defendant began, and stated that following
the interview with Detective Edwards, he had a short conversation
with defendant, who told him, "I told 'em 1 did it so they would
let Rosemary go" (R. 130 at 43).
Audrey Robinson, defendant's sister, testified that her
brother was at her home on August 21, 1988, and stayed there
while Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus took the car to drive
Genora home (R. 130 at 48-50).

On rebuttal, Detective Edwards

testified that he telephoned Ms. Robinson on the evening of the

robbery and she said that she had not seen defendant all day (R.
130 at 70).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court need not address the issues raised by
defendant regarding the in-court identification and the
admissibility of out-of-court statements because they are merely
cumulative to his confession.

Defendant has not challenged the

admission of his confession on appeal, stating only that he
testified that the confession never happened.

The issues raised

by defendant were harmless error, if they were error at all,
because the contested evidence was cumulative to defendant's
confession.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the evidence of the in-court identification of
defendant by a witness.

The comparison of that in-court

identification with results from a previous lineup and a lineup
photograph at trial applies to the weight the jury was to give to
the identification, rather than to its admissibility.

An

extensive eyewitness identification instruction was given which
helped the jury in determiningwhat weight to give the in-court
identification.
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion when
it allowed the out-of-court statements of witnesses who had been
present when defendant committed the robbery but who did not
appear for trial.

The witnesses were friends of defendant, one

of whom had moved and was living under an assumed name.

The

other lived with her mother whom the detective contacted.

The

mother told the detective that the witness had received her
subpoena and would be at trial.

The State had demonstrated the

unavailability of the witnesses after diligent effort to secure
their attendance.
The State also established the reliability of the
statements by showing that they were made against interest.

They

were also consistent with the defendant's confession, with each
other, and with the observation of other witnesses.
Finally, defendant's claim that the imposition of an
enhanced sentence for use of a firearm in the commission of an
aggravated robbery violated statutory construction and the Double
Jeopardy Clause must fail.

The firearm enhancement statute was

enacted after the aggravated robbery statutte and does not
expressly exclude aggravated robbery from its ambit.

Since the

enhancement statute is not ambiguous and includes aggravated
robbery on its face, this Court must presume that the legislature
intended to include aggravated robbery in the firearm enhancement
provision.
Neither does this use of the firearm enhancement
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The United States Supreme

Court and the Utah Supreme Court have determined that the
imposition of cumulative punishments is a legislative matter.
If, as here, the legislature has established further enhancement
for the use of a firearm, and has declared when it may be
imposed, there is no double jeopardy problem.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S VOLUNTARY CONFESSION TO OFFICER
EDWARDS, AFTER BEING ADVISED UNDER MIRANDA,
RENDERS THE ALLEGED ERRORS RAISED IN POINTS I
AND II OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF HARMLESS.
The first two issues raised by defendant on appeal are
that the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting the
in-court identification by Micki Horn, and in admitting the outof-court statements of Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus.

The

merits of these claims will be addressed hereafter, but the
issues can be resolved without reaching the merits.

Detective

Edwards testified that defendant confessed to him that defendant
did commit the robbery.

Shortly before trial, defendant filed a

motion to suppress the statement taken by Detective Edwards (R.
at 23). No memorandum in support of that motion was filed, but
defendant stated his position on the motion at a hearing which
was held an hour before trial (R. 131).
At that hearing, defendant admitted that he was aware
that the prosecution intended to use his admissions but
complained that he had not received a copy of the officer's
report containing the statement (R. 131 at 4). He did not claim
a discovery violation.

Neither did he claim that he was not

properly advised of his right to counsel under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); in fact, he testified that he had
been so advised (R. 131 at 19). Also at that hearing, defendant
testified that he had never made the admission to Detective
Edwards (R. 131 at 21). The trial court obviously found the
detective's testimony more credible and ruled that the confession
was admissible (R. 131 at 28).

On appeal, defendant does not challenge this ruling.
The only briefly mentions his confession in his brief at pages
15, 27 and 32. At page 15, defendant says that "[t]he only other
evidence tying Appellant to the crime was his confession, which
the jurors might have discounted as his effort to protect his
girlfriend, or as never having been made, and the unreliable
confessions of Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus, . . . "

At page

27 defendant says, ••[a]ppellant testified at the suppression
hearing that his confession never occurred".

Finally, at page

32, defendant maintains:
In this case, the confessions of Ms. Mar,
Ms. Marcellus, and Appellant were the only
evidence of Appellant's participation in the
robbery (aside from the in court
identification by the victim, Micki Horn,
which should have been suppressed!). The
confessions in this case interlocked to a
great degree, and must have added credence to
the confession that Officer Edwards testified
Appellant made to him. In the absence of the
admission of the statements Ms. Mar and Ms.
Marcellus allegedly made to Officer Edwards,
the jurors might have discounted Appellant's
alleged confession as fiction authored by
Officer Edwards, or as Appellant's effort to
protect his girlfriend, Rosemary Mar.
It is clear that defendant wanted the jury to believe that he
never confessed to Detective Edwards so the other women also may
not have made the statements Detective Edwards contributes to
them.

It is also clear that the trial court did not accept that

theory because it allowed into evidence defendant's confession,
as well as the statements of the two women involved.

Finally, it

is clear that the jury also did not believe that Detective
Edwards was lying about the confession and statements which he
took from the participants of the robbery.

Defendant has not

presented a legal challenge to the admission of his confession.
Since defendant has not done so and since the confession was
corroborated by the eyewitness evidence, any alleged error in
admitting the in-court identification of Ms. Horn and the out-ofcourt statements of Mar and Marcellus was harmless at most.
Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that "any error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-30 (1982).

The Utah

Supreme Court, in the case of State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah
1989), referred to harmless error as error "sufficiently
inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
proceeding."

Ld. at 120; see also State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913,

919 (Utah 1987) and State v. Dibello, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 20
(1989) (videotape complained of was no more gruesome than
cumulative photographs, the admission of which defendant did not
appeal).
Officer Ron Edwards of the West Valley Police
Department testified that during an interview conducted the day
following the robbery, defendant made a voluntary confession:
After the two other officers left the room I
asked him point blank, did you do the
robbery? He said, what's in it for me? I
said, I can't give you any promises.
Everything's going to have to go through the
county attorney's office. He stated, I don't
want Rosemary charged. I says, I still
cannot give you a guarantee. I said, that's
up to the county attorney's office about
that. He stated, yes, I did it. I said,
will you explain it to me how you did it. He
says that they were at his sister's place,

Audrey's on Sunday afternoon, Thtey left the
house in her car. They were goinb west.
That Rosemary wanted him to do the robbery.
It was his girlfriend. That they went out to
the Payless Shoe on 5600 West and 3500 South.
He had the two girls go in to look at the
building, the Payless Shoes, how many girls
were there, where the safe was and the
diagram of the place, more or less, at which
time they came out, then he went in and
robbed them.
He stated he had a shotgun, that he put
the mask over his head. He went in there
with the shotgun. He stated at that time it
wasn't loaded, that he didn't want to hurt
anybody. He said he went in there, had
forced one woman down, he took the other
woman back to the safe and to the till, put
the money in a denim bag and ran but.
He said he got in the car; the\y took off.
As he went down one of the streets they said
a West Valley officer turned around on 'em;
they tried to evade him. He jumped out at
that time.
He says that Rosemary threw tne gun and
the money out of the car. He went into the
bushes in a field, did a semi circle and
watched the officers there from across the
street in the weeds.
After the vehicle was impounded and
everybody left he then started to hitchhike,
A gentleman in an older pickup pi eked him up,
he was home — well, he was with his sister,
Audrey, at the time when I called Audrey
about 8:00 o'clock on the night before, that
he was at his sister's residence.
(R. 129 at 159-160).

In addition, Scott Carver, defendant's

parole officer, testified that, following the interview with
Detective Edwards, he had a short conversation with defendant,
who told him, "I told 'em I did it so they Would let Rosemary go"
(R. 130 at 43).
The confession by the defendant, taken by Detective
Edwards and confirmed by Officer Carver, along with substantial
consistent circumstantial evidence presented at trial, was
sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated robbery.

The

identification testimony by Micki Horn challenged in Point I and
the statements by the codefendants challenged in Point II were
merely surplus evidence unnecessary for conviction.

Therefore,

even if one assumed that the trial court erred on either of the
grounds raised in Points I and II, the likelihood of a different
outcome was not "sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the
verdict," and any error would be harmless.

State v. Knight, 734

P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) .
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE IN-COURT
IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT BY MICKI HORN.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by allowing
the in-court identification of defendant by eyewitness, Micki
Horn.

While any error on this point would be harmless (see Point

I), it is also clear that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by allowing the identification testimony.
Ms. Horn testified that during the robbery, as she was
removing the money from the register, she was able to closely
observe defendant "looking right at his face the whole time." (R.
129 at 55, 57). Following the robbery, Horn gave police a
description of defendant's clothing which was consistent with the
testimony of other witnesses, and a description of defendant
4
which was very similar to his general appearance.

As part of her description, Ms. Horn told police she
believed defendant was possibly a male Hispanic. While the State
acknowledges defendant is black, his light skin color is
consistent with the Hispanic race (See Def. Exh. #2).
_i c_

At trial, over the objection of defense counsel, the
court allowed Horn to make an in-court identification from her
independent recollection.

Horn testified:

Well, when I walked in I sat down and he
turned around and it hit me like a ton of
bricks. I recognized him. And that was it.
And everything about him — the features — I
just . . . it was him. I just couldn't—I
don't know. But I recognized himL The way
he moved, the way his back was overf the
wrinkles on the forehead, his nos©f
everything.
(R. 129 at 57-58).
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that the
Court "will not interfere with the trial court's ruling on
evidentiary matters unless it clearly appeals that the court so
abused its discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice
resulted."

State v. McClain/ 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985); see also

State v. Gentry/ 7.47 P.2d 1032/ 1035 (Utah X987); State v.
McCardell/ 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982).
Defendant argues on appeal that Htirn's identification
"was the product of the fact that defendant was the person
sitting in the defendant's chair at trial"/ and in support
thereof/ points to two previous misidentif ictations by Horn; the
first/ during a lineup conducted September 29/ 1988/ and the
second/ during trial from a photo of the September 29th lineup.
While the misidentifications may have affected the
weight given Horn's testimony/ the trial court properly
determined that they did not preclude her from making a
subsequent in-court identification/ especially under the
circumstances that the misidentifications w0re made.

Horn testified that during the September 29th lineup
she was not wearing her glasses, and made the identification from
the back row of the observation room.

In addition, Horn

testified she was distracted:
I had a 12-month old baby with me in a
stroller and she was off to the side of me
and as soon as we walked in she was getting
real ansy [sic]. She picked up her bottle
and threw it down and I was trying to keep
her quiet while I was trying to watch the
lineup.
(R. 129 at 56). Finally, Horn placed the lineup identification
number on the reverse side of the identification card which she
was told to do if she was not positive of the identification (R.
129 at 56).
The second misidentification, which occurred during
trial, is equally explainable.

On cross-examination, defense

counsel asked Horn if she could identify defendant from a photo
of the September 29th lineup.

Ms. Horn indicated that she

believed defendant was in the number two position (R. 129 at 66).
The State stipulated that defendant was actually in the number
three position.

This mistake seemed to be unexplainable until

later when evidence showed that the individual in position number
two was actually defendant's cousin who was similar in appearance
(R. 130 at 60-61).

In addition, Ms. Horn testified that when she

initially observed the photo she believed defendant to be either
in position number two or three, but only chose number two
5
because he appeared to be shorter (R. 129 at 71).

In the lineup photo the individual in position number 2 has
his head tilted down.

Considering the circumstances, allowing the evidence
was not a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court.

Horn gave reasonable explanations for the

misidentifications; she had ample opportunity to observe
defendant at the time of the robbery "looking right at his face
the whole time", sufficient to make an accurate identification of
defendant at trial; and the jury was properly guided by the use
of a lengthy cautionary instruction concerning eyewitness
testimony (R. at 97-100) as required by Sta^e v. Long, 721 P.2d
483 (Utah 1986).

All of this supported the admission of the

identification testimony.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE HEARSAY
STATEMENTS OF ROSEMARY MAR AND GENORA MARCELLUS
PURSUANT TO RULE 802 OF THE UTAH RULES OF
EVIDENCE.
Defendant next argues that he was denied his "rights to
confrontation under the Utah and federal constitutions" when the
trial court allowed the statements of Rosemary Mar and Genora
Marcellus to be admitted upon a finding that the witnesses were
unavailable pursuant to Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Again, any error on this point would be harmless (see Point I),
thus it was not a clear abuse of discretion for the trial court
to allow the testimony.
The United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56 (1980) stated:
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not
present for cross-examination at trial the
Confrontation Clause normally requires a
showing that he is unavailable. Even then,
his statement is admissible only if it bears

adequate 'indicia of reliability.'
Reliability can be inferred without more in a
case where the evidence falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception. In other cases,
the evidence must be excluded, at least
absent a showing of particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness.
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (footnote omitted).

Sufficient evidence

was presented at trial to establish witness unavailability and
the reliability of the statements.
A.

Unavailability

Prior to trial, the court received testimony regarding
the prosecution's efforts to assure the attendance of witnesses
Genora Marcellus and Rosemary Mar at trial.

Subpoenas were sent

to both witnesses, twice to Rosemary Mar.
Detective Edwards testified that only a few days prior
to trial, he made the following attempts to assure the witnesses
presence at trial.

Edwards phoned the home of Ms. Marcellus's

mother, Haydie Grand, where Marcellus was then residing.

Grand

answered the phone, and, after indicating that Ms. Marcellus was
not at home, assured Edwards that Marcellus "had received the
subpoena [and] that she was going to be there."

(R. 131 at 39-

40).
Edwards was unable to locate Ms. Mar at her home
address (its location was found through use of department
informants), and had discovered just the day before trial that
she had been going by an assumed name.

Edwards also received

information of another possible address from Salt Lake County
Investigator Steve Bartlett, which also came up negative when he
tried to find Mar (R. 131 at 40). Testimony at trial showed that

Mar was possibly living in Indiana, but the address was unknown
(R. 130 at 51).
The trial court determined that the State had made a
sufficient showing of unavailability.

As n0ted in Point II, the

Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that the Court "will
not interfere with the trial court's ruling on evidentiary
matters unless it clearly appears that the court so abused its
discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice resulted."
State v. McClainf 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985); see also State v.
Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1987); Stftte v. McCardell, 652
P.2d 942 (Utah 1982).

This standard of review includes a trial

court's determination of whether "prosecutorial authorities have
made a good faith effort to obtain . . . [the presence of a
witness] at trial."

State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981).

In Brooks, the Utah Supreme Court stated "we will not reverse the
ruling of the trial judge that the efforts were made in good
faith in the absence of a showing of clear abuse of discretion."
Id. at 539.; see also State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah
1982); Gallegos v. Turner, 526 P.2d 1128 (Utah 1974).
The effort to compel the attendance of Genora Marcellus
was clearly

sufficient due to the reasonable reliance by the

State that the witness would voluntarily comply with the
subpoena.

In State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982), the

Utah Supreme Court upheld a trial court finding that a witness
was "unavailable" when a witness failed to comply with a subpoena
after he had assured the county attorney of his intention to
comply.

The Court explained:

When Scoville first contacted the county
attorney on February 26, he said he would
attend the trial. Because of these
responses, the State had no reason to
question Scovillefs availability prior to
seven days before trial. After learning late
on February 26 that Scoville would not attend
and failing in their attempts to contact
Scoville's employer on February 27, the State
had only five days to implement the Uniform
Act. While it is possible to imagine more
concerted efforts by the State to secure
voluntary compliance, we hold on these facts
that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the State
acted in good faith in attempting to secure
Scoville's attendance at trial.
Id. at 1123-24.

In the present case, the prosecution had

received no direct information which would cause it to question
the assurances given by Genora Marcellus' mother that her
daughter would comply with the subpoena.

While the prosecution

could have used other methods to ensure compliance, such was
unnecessary when there was reason to believe the witness would do
so voluntarily.
The effort to compel the attendance of Rosemary Mar was
similarly sufficient due to inability of the prosecution to
locate the witness.

Unlike those cases where a prosecutor had

specific knowledge of the whereabouts of a witness and thereafter
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Case, 752 P.2d 356
(Utah App. 1987), cert, denied 765 P.2d 1277 (1987), determined
that even with assurances by a witness of an intent to comply
with a subpoena, a trial court erred by finding a witness
unavailable after noncompliance with the subpoena. Yet, this
case is fact sensitive and distinguishable from the case at bar.
In Case, the witness was critical, constantly moved ("nomadic
habits"), was located outside the State, and was unstable
financially. Under these facts the Court indicated that the
prosecutor should have secured attendance by using Uniform Act to
Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State in
Criminal Proceedings, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 77-21-1 et
seq. (1982).

failed to compel attendance, in the present case, tne
prosecution, after a good-faith effort, was not able to locate
the witness.

As testified by Detective Edwards, the witness

could not be located at her home address or at even a second
possible address, and was going under an assumed name.

In

addition, there was evidence that one of the witnesses may have
been residing in Indiana, but the exact location was unknown.
In State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), the Utah
Supreme Court upheld a trial court's determination that witnesses
(victims) were "unavailable" after an officer testified that
M

[h]e had contacted all known relatives, likely hangouts, the

local bus terminals and out of state police." ^d. at 540. In
upholding the determination, the Court stated, "[a]lthough in
retrospect other efforts might have been madfe [to locate the
witnesses], the determination does not appear to us to be an
abuse of discretion."

]^d. at 540.

In Ohio y. Roberts, 448 U.S.

56, 75 (1980), the United States Supreme Court found a good-faith
effort to ensure a witness' presence where the prosecution had
subpoenaed the witness five times, and the witness' family had
not been able to locate her for a year.

It does not appear that

the efforts made in those cases were any greater than in the case
at bar.

And it appears that the courts in other states have

upheld less good-faith efforts as sufficient.

See e.g. State v.

Grier, 331 S.E.2d 669 (N.C. 1985) (effort consisted of repeated
attempts to locate witness at various addresses by phone and
person); State v. Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d 773 (Mo. App. 1980)
(sheriff unsuccessfully attempted to serve subpoena on witness

and made inquiries in the general area of his usual place of
residence).
While it is conceivable that other methods possibly
could have been used to locate the witness, the prosecution was
not required to exhaust all possible alternatives in order to
show unavailability, and, under the circumstances, it is very
questionable whether any other methods would have located the
7
witness.
It was clearly not an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to determine that the witnesses were unavailable.
B. Reliability of the Statements.
As required by Roberts, the out-of-court statements
must also bear adequate "indicia of reliability" in order to be
admissible.

The statements of Genora Marcellus and Rosemary Mar

were sufficiently reliable for at least two reasons.

First, as

determined by the trial court, the statements made by the
witnesses were "statements against interest" as defined by Utah
Rules of Evidence 804.

Second, the independent statements given

by the witnesses, and the defendant, were consistent in all
material respects.
As indicated above, the United States Supreme Court in
Roberts stated, " [reliability can be inferred without more in a
case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception."

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. At the pretrial hearing on

defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court determined that
7
Taking into consideration that the witness could not be
located at her home address, nor at a second address, and was
going under an assumed name, and was facing possible criminal
charges, it would be reasonable to assume the witness was
intentionally evading the law.

the statements of Genora Marcellus and Rosemary Mar were within
the "firmly rooted hearsay exception" of statements against
interest under Rule 804(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule 804(b)(3) provides in pertinent part:
A statement which was at the time of its
making so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest , or so far
tended to subject him to civil or| criminal
liability, or to render invalid a claim by
him against another, that a reasonable man in
his position would not have made the
Statement unless he believed it to be true.
Rule 804, Utah Rules of Evidence (emphasis added).

While the

witnesses may have denied responsibility for the robbery, or even
knowledge of the robbery until after it was committed, their
statements concerning their participation clearly exposed them to
a possibility of criminal prosecution, at least for assisting in
o

the commission of a crime.
The testimony of the witnesses wa$ also reliable due to
the consistency of the statements.

While the evidence shows that

the witnesses were interviewed separately, each of the statements
was entirely consistent with the others in all material
9
respects.
The United States Supreme Court in Lee v. Illinois,
476 U.S. 530 (1986) stated "when codefendants' confessions are
identical in all material respects, the likelihood that they are
o
While neither witness has been convicted for participating
in the robbery, such is not required by Rule 804 in order to be a
statement against interest.
Q

The only differences in the statements were insignificant,
and concerned, as defendant concedes, only three limited areas:
(1) witness foreknowledge of the robbery; (2) participation in
"casing" the store; and (3) which participant wanted the robbery
committed. A fourth possible area, also insignificant, is where
the car was parked prior to the robbery.

accurate is significantly increased."

Lee, 476 U.S. at 545. The

comment by the Court is basic common sense.

Where three

consistent statements are taken from three different individuals,
not in the presence of each other, and without knowledge of what
the other may have stated, the probability that the statements
are true is very high.

Because the statements were consistent

and were against the witnesses' penal interest, there is little
doubt that the statements were reliable.

Having established the

unavailability of the witnesses and the reliability of their
statements, the prosecution did not abridge the defendant's right
to confrontation, and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by allowing the testimony.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SENTENCED DEFENDANT TO
AN ADDITIONAL TERM OF FIVE YEARS FOR USE OF A
FIREARM..
In his final argument, defendant contends that the
trial court erred by sentencing him to a term of five years to
life upon his conviction of aggravated robbery, Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-302 (Supp. 1989), along with an additional five year
enhancement for use of a firearm during the commission of a
felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1989).
Defendant claims, "[t]his double enhancement of Defendant's
sentence is not supported by the applicable statutes, and

Defendant attempts to attack this consistency on the
grounds that it was a single officer who took the testimony and
without the use of a tape recorder. Yet, it was defendant who
asked that their statements not be recorded and that the other
officers leave the room (R. 131 at 12-13 and 25). Defendant's
attack on the officer's credibility is without merit.

violated Defendant's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of
the Utah and United States Constitutions" (Brief of Appellant at
35).

To determine whether the enhancemerit of defendant's

sentence was proper, it is necessary to determine the legislative
intent § 76-3-203.
A.

Firearm Enhancement

When construing a statute, the CoMrt must be controlled
by the evident purpose of the legislature tb attain a certain
end; a statute should not be applied or construed so as to
produce incongruous results that were never intended.
v. Navaro, 8 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955, 959 (1933).

See State

A "'statute should

be looked at in its entirety and in accordance with the purpose
which was sought to be accomplished.'" State v. Davis, 769 P.2d
840 (Utah App. 1989), citing Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County,
568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977); see also State v. Helm, 563 P.2d
794 (Utah 1977); State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 190, 407 P.2d 571
(1965).

The best evidence of the true intejit and purpose of the

legislature in enacting a statute is the pldin language of the
statute. See Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d
903, 906 (Utah 1984); State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Utah
1984).

Finally, "it is the policy of the Court to construe

statutes when possible to effectuate the legislative intent and
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that "as a
general rule, we will not engage in state constitutional analysis
unless an argument for different analyses under the State and
federal constitutions is briefed." State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d
1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255
(Utah 1987); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-273 (Utah 1985).
Since defendant has not argued a different analysis for the State
and federal constitutions, this Court should! address this issue
on federal constitutional grounds only.

to avoid potential constitutional conflicts."

State v. Casarez,

656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 1982).
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently recognized the
principle that its primary responsibility in construing
legislation is to determine and give effect to the legislative
intent.

Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317; Bd. of Educ.

of Granite Sch. v. Salt Lake Cityf 659 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah
1983); Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755, 756
(Utah 1982).

As stated in Bd. of Educ. of Granite Sch. v. Salt

Lake City;
the fundamental consideration in interpreting
statutes is legislative intent; and that is
determined in light of the purpose the
statute was designed to achieve. Intent is
applied to carry out the purpose if it can be
done in a manner which is consistent with the
language of the statue. . . . "The intention
of the legislature, however, should be
controlling and no formalistic rule of
grammar of word form should stand in the way
of carrying out legislative intent."
659 P.2d at 1033 (citations omitted) (emphasis deleted) (quoting
1A Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed.) § 25.03.

Reason

and intention must prevail over "technically applied
literalness", Andrus v. Allredy 17 Utah 2d 106, 109, 404 P.2d
972, 974 (1965).
Turning to the statutes in question, Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-302 (1978) reads in pertinent part:
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the
course of committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife
or a facsimile of a knife or a deadly weapon. *
Defendant argues that since the aggravated robbery statute
specifically refers to "firearm", whereas other Utah aggravated
*%o

statutes use the more generic term "deadly weapon", the Utah
legislature intended any firearm enhancement for robbery to be
included solely in the substantive statute and excluded from
inclusion in the enhancement statute.
To properly answer defendant's argument, the
legislative history and statutory language of both statutes must
be reviewed with a view to harmonizing their intended purposes.
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318; Utah County v. Orem
City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985).
The legislative record does not reveal why the
aggravated robbery statute was amended in 1975 to include the
firearm and facsimile language.

However, the legislative history

does establish that two years later, in 1977, growing public
concern over the increased use of firearms in the commission of
crimes in Utah prompted the Utah legislature to enact the
enhancement statute increasing the penalty for any felony
committed by use of a firearm.

See House debate on Utah Code

Ann. § 76-6-302, aggravated robbery statute, originally S.B. 159,
passed by House of Representatives March 13, 1975, disc. #405;
and House debate on Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203, enhanced penalty
statute, originally H.B. 323, passed by House of Representatives
February 28, 1977, disc. #181-82. No legislative record could be
found of Senate debate on either bill.
The language of the enhancement statute is clear and
unambiguous in its scope.

It mandates the imposition of an

increased term of one to five years "if the trier of fact finds a
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was

used in the commission of the furtherance of a felony".

Utah

Code Ann. 76-3-203 (1). State v. Willettf 694 P.2d 601, 603
(Utah 1984).

Unlike other sentencing statutes, the enhancement

statue contains no exclusionary language.

See for comparison,

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-406(1) (Supp. 1989) (probation, suspension,
and lower category of offense shall not be granted for certain
listed attempt crimes); Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 (Supp. 1989)
(classification of criminal attempt); and, Utah Code Ann. § 76-81001 (1978) (habitual criminal statute not applicable to murder
in first or second degree).

Without any clear exclusions, the

enhancement provision, on its face, applies to all felonies.
Such an interpretation is consistent with the Supreme
Court's rule that:
Statutes are considered to be in pari
materia and thus must be construed together
when they relate to the same person or thing,
to the same class of persons or things, or
have the same purpose or object. If it is
natural or reasonable to think that the
understanding of the legislature or of
persons affected by the statute would be
influenced by another statute, then those
statutes should be construed to be in pari
materia, construed with reference to one
another and harmonized if possible.
Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (footnotes omitted).
Accord, Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318; State v.
Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986).

Thus, in the absence of any

express repealing language or amendment, a new statutory
provision is presumed to be in accord with the legislative policy
embodied in prior statutes covering the same subject matter.
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314. 1318, citing 2A C. Sands,
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51.02, at 290 (4th ed. 1973).

Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are compared
with the new provision.

If possible by reasonable construction,

both statutes should be construed such that effect is given to
every provision in both of them.

Id*

at

13DL8. Accord, Ellis v.

Utah State Retirement Bd., 757 P.2d 882f 884-85 (Utah App. 1988).
But, if an irreconcilable conflict still exists between the old
and new statutory language, the new statutory provision will
control as the latest expression of legislative intent.

Murray

City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318.
This Court must accord a statute every presumption of
validity.

Timpanogos Planning v. Central Ut|ah Water, 690 P.2d

562, 564 (Utah 1984), citing Murray City v. Hall.

Further, a

statute must be interpreted and applied in light of its purpose.
State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah 1977).

Here, based on the

legislative history and statutory language, ithere can be no
serious dispute that the Utah legislature intended to penalize
more severely substantive felony crimes if committed by use of a
firearm than if not.

State v. Willett, 694 p.2d 601, 603. Nor,

can there be any reasonable dispute that the Utah legislature
views aggravated robbery as seriously as othfer aggravated crimes
12
13
such as aggravated kidnapping , aggravated $exual assault
and
14
aggravated burglary.
Yet, in each of the latter cases, the
penalty for the substantive nonaggravated offense may first be
increased to an aggravated offense by the use of a firearm; and,

12

Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-302 (Supp. 1989).

13

Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-405 (Supp. 1989).

14

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-203 (Supp. 1989).

still have imposed an enhancement to the aggravated crime based
solely on the use of the firearm.

Why, then, would the Utah

legislature have not intended for a similarly severe punishment
in the case of an aggravated robbery committed by use of a
firearm?

The answer is that they did provide for a similar

penalty*

The very absence of any exclusionary language in the

subsequently enacted enhancement provision stands as a silent
pronouncement of the legislative intent to include all felonies
within its scope, even when the substantive offense is defined as
aggravated due to the use of a firearm.
Defendant contends that such legislative action is
prohibited by Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978).
However, the type of statutory construction argument utilized in
Simpson has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in State v.
Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978), and has been substantially
modified by subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions.
Simpson involved the federal court's interpretation of
overlapping federal statutes.

The issue was whether the federal

firearm enhancement provision should be applicable to the federal
armed bank robbery statute.

Rather than approaching the statutes

from their plain meaning, the Court looked first to the
enhancement provision's very specific legislative history.

Based

on the recorded statements of the sponsor of the enhancement
provision that the federal armed robbery statute was exempted
from inclusion, as well as the congressional record, the United
States Supreme Court held that the federal armed robbery statute
was legislatively intended to be exempted from the federal

firearm enhancement provision.

435 U.S. at 13.

Because of this

express legislative intent, the Court concluded that the armed
robbery and enhancement statutes created two separate and
distinct offenses.

As such, under federal strict construction

principles, any conflict between the statutes has to be resolved
in favor of lenity.

Iji- at 14-15.

Six months after the Simpson decision, the Utah Supreme
Court took the opposite point of departure.

In State v. Angus,

581 P.2d 992 (1978), the Utah Supreme Court held that the Utah
enhancement provisions and other substantive Utah felonies were
not distinct crimes.

Rather, the enhancement provision was

merely a sentencing statute designed to incnease penalties under
specified conditions.

As noted, any argument that Utah Code Ann.

S 76-3-203, the enhancement statute, creates a separate offense,
imposing multiple sentences for the same criminal act is:
a distortion of its language. When the
matter is looked at correctly and
realistically, it is seen that there is but
one criminal act charged. . . .
Id. at 994. Accord, State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 273 (Utah
1985) (enhancement provision is not an element of the crime, but
only an aspect of punishment).
When viewed as a penalty provision and not a
substantive offense, the Utah enhancement provision can be read
harmoniously with the Utah aggravated robbery statute.

Under

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302, aggravated robbery may be committed in
an number of ways; but, if one of those methods is by use of a
firearm, the defendant's sentence is subject to enhancement.
ambiguities exist to reconcile.

No

At best, the aggravated robbery

language, "uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or a
facsimile of a knife or a deadly weapon" merely parallels the
type of facsimile language used in the enhancement provision.
But the plain meaning of both statutes is that while an armed
robbery may be committed by the use of any deadly weapon, when
that weapon is a firearm or facsimile of an firearm, the penalty
will be enhanced. 15 Where there exists clear legislative intent
to provide for an increased punishment, this Court should not
infer a contrary intent simply because the statutory language may
be unartful or piecemealed.

State v. Willett, 694 P.2d 601, 603.

But, even if this court were to espouse Simpson v.
United States as applicable to this case, the United States
Supreme Court has substantially clarified its original holding.
In Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981), the United

Utah's aggravated robbery statute was amended again in 1989
to read:
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if
in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; . • .
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (Supp. 1989).
Section 76-1-601 defines dangerous weapon as follows:
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item
capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury, or a facsimile or representation of
the item, and:
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended
use of the item leads the victim to
reasonably believe the item is likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) the actor represents to the victim
verbally or in any other manner that he is in
control of such an item.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-601 (Supp. 1989).
-.^4-

States Supreme Court concluded that:
the "touchstone" of the rule of lenity
[utilized in Simpson] "is statutory
ambiguity.". . . "Where Congress has
manifested its intention, we may not
manufacture ambiguity in order to defeat the
intent.". . . Lenity thus serves only as an
aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to
be used to beget one.
450 U.S. at 342 (quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381,
387 (1980)).
Even more expressly, the United States Supreme Court
held that, under state law, a defendant could be convicted and
punished for armed robbery, assault with malice and armed
criminal action all as a result of the same criminal actions.
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983).

Rejecting the state

supreme court's holding of a double jeopardy violation, the
federal supreme court concluded that the doiible jeopardy clause
"does no more that prevent the sentencing court from prescribing
greater punishment that the legislature intended." JW. at 366.
As such, even cumulative punishments are not constitutionally
prohibited where there is clear legislative intent in support.
Citing Albernaz, the Court stated that the ihquiry for purposes
of statutory construction or double jeopardy claims is merely to
discern what the legislative intent was in enacting the two
provisions.

If the sentencing scheme is consistent with that

purpose and not otherwise arbitrary, the statutory provisions
must be given effect.

Id. at 368-69.

Here, the Utah legislature enacted a penalty for
aggravated robbery, defined in part as robbery committed by use
of a firearm.

Some two years later, without express exemption,

repeal or amendment, the Utah legislature enacted an equally
clear statute mandating the imposition of an enhanced penalty for
any felony where a firearm is used.

Read together and with the

purposes and intent of the criminal code, it is clear that no
ambiguity exists as to the meaning or scope of either statute*
The plain meaning of the statutes being apparent and no
legislative history existing to show a contrary intent, this
Court must implement the statutory penalties intended by law.
B. The Double Jeopardy Clause
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States
Constitution simply provides that no person shall "be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
United States Constitution, Amendment V.

While the language of

the Clause appears quite simple, it has fostered considerable
confusion and controversy in the past, prompting Chief Justice
Renquist to once comment, "the decisional law in the area is a
veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most
intrepid judicial navigator."
U.S. 333, 343 (1981).

Albernaz v. United States, 450

Albernaz, and subsequent opinions of the

Court, have significantly clarified the proper role of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.

While there remains some controversy to its

specific application in certain contexts, the specific issue
raised by defendant in this case has been unequivocally resolved.
The present issue, whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
may prevent an enhanced sentence for use of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1989),
when the underlying substantive felony is aggravated robbery,

Utah Code Anr

-6-302 (Supp. 1989) , a n d
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I • Whaleii \ I Inited States, 445 U S. 684 (1980), justice
Blackmun, i i i I i is concurring o p i n i o n , stated:|
D i c t a in r e c e n t opinions of this Cour t a 1:
least have suggested, and I now think
wrongly, that the Double Jeopardy (piause may
prevent the imposition of cumulative

Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980), that the Court took
a significant step toward resolving the controversy.
In Whalen, the Court took the opportunity to address
the issue of Double Jeopardy in the cumulative punishment
context, even though it was unnecessary to reach the Court's
decision.

Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated:
The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy protects not only against a second
trial for the same offense, but also "against
multiple punishments for the same offense,"
North Carolina v. Pierce, supra, at 717, 89
S.Ct., at 2076 (footnote omitted). But the
question whether punishments imposed by a
court after a defendant's conviction upon
criminal charges are unconstitutionally
multiple cannot be resolved without
determining what punishments the Legislative
Branch has authorized.

The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy embodies in this respect simply one

Cont. punishments in situations in which
the Legislative Branch clearly intended that
multiple penalties be imposed for a single
criminal transaction. See Simpson v. United
States, 435 U.S. 6, 11-13, 98 S.Ct. 909, 912913, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978); Jeffers v. United
States, 432 U.S. 137, 155, 97 S.Ct. 2207,
2218, 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977), (plurality
opinion). I believe that the Court should
take the opportunity presented by this case
to repudiate those dicta squarely, and to
hold clearly that the question of what
punishments are constitutionally permissible
is not different from the question of what
punishments the Legislative Branch in tended
to be imposed. I must concede that the dicta
that seemingly support a contrary view have
caused confusions among state courts that
have attempted to decipher our pronouncements
concerning the Double Jeopardy Clauses role
in the area of multiple punishments.
Whalen, 445 U.S. at 697-98.
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Last Term in Whalen v. United States, this
Court stated that "the question whether
..""Jin i uinand in Sours v. State, 603 S.W.2d,592 (Mo. 1 9 8 0 )
( herein* f ier called Sours II) the Missouri Supreme Court upheJd
their earlier ruling. T h e State's petition tor certiorari was
thereafter denied. See Missouri v. Sours, 4 4Q TI •; i m (19 81)

punishments imposed by a court after a
defendant's conviction upon criminal charges
are unconstitutionally multiple cannot be
resolved without determining what punishments
the Legislative Branch has authorized," . . .
This is so because the "power to define
criminal offenses and to prescribe
punishments to be imposed upon those found
guilty of them, resides wholly with the
Congress." Ibid. As we previously noted in
Brown v, Ohio, "[w]here consecutive sentences
are imposed at a single criminal trial, the
role of the constitutional guarantee is
limited to assuring that the court does not
exceed its legislative authorization by
imposing multiple punishments for the same
offense." 432 U.S., at 165,. Thus, the
question of what punishments are
constitutionally permissible is not different
from the question of what punishments the
Legislative Branch intended to be imposed.
Where Congress intended, as it did here, to
impose multiple punishments, imposition of
such sentences does not violate the
Constitution.
Id. at 1145 (emphasis added).

Following Albernaz, the Court

again vacated a number of State Court decisions, which, despite
Whalen, continued to find a double jeopardy violation for
multiple punishment, even where there existed clear legislative
intent. 19
19
Following Sours II, the Missouri Supreme Court began
reversing convictions for armed criminal action in a number of
cases. In nearly every case the State sought review by petition
for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. The
Court in every case granted certiorari and vacated the decision
in light of Albernaz. See e.g., Missouri v. Counselman, 603
S.W.2d 709 (1980), vacated 450 U.S. 990 (1981); Missouri v.
McGee, 602 S.W.2d 709 (1980), vacated 450 U.S. 990 (1981);
Missouri v. Payne, 607 S.W.2d 822 (1980), vacated 450 U.S. 990
(1981); Missouri v. White, 610 S.W.2d 646 (1980), vacated 450
U.S. 990 (1981); Missouri v. Williams, 610 S.W.2d 644 (1980),
vacated 450 U.S. 990 (1981). In addition to the Missouri
decisions, the Court vacated two similar Delaware decisions. See
Delaware v. Hunter, 420 A.2d 119 (1980), vacated 405 U.S. 991
(1981); Delaware v. Evans, 420 A.2d 1186 (1980), vacated, 450
U.S. 991 (1981). Notably, it appears that it was the continued
refusal of the Missouri courts to conform to the Supreme Court
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[W]e need hardly go so far as suggested to
decide that a legislature constitutionally
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violation of its first-degree robbery statute
and its arrnr-4 --iminal motion statute.

19
Cont , decisions in wnalen and Albernaz which later led the
Court to unequivocally decide the issue in Missouri v. Hunter.

Particularly in light of recent precedents of
this Court, it is clear that the Missouri
Supreme Court has misperceived the nature of
the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection
against multiple punishments. With respect
to cumulative sentences imposed in a single
trialt the Double Jeopardy Clause does no
more than prevent the sentencing court from
prescribing greater punishment than the
legislature intended.

Our analysis and reasoning in Whalen and
Albernaz lead inescapably to the conclusion
that simply because two criminal statutes may
be construed to proscribe the same conduct
under the Blockburger test does not mean that
the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the
imposition, in a single trial, of cumulative
punishments pursuant to those statutes.

Where, as here, a legislature specifically
authorizes cumulative punishment under two
statutes, regardless of whether those two
statutes proscribe the "same" conduct under
Blockburger, a court's task of statutory
construction is at an end and the prosecutor
may seek and the trial court or jury may
impose cumulative punishment under such
statutes in a single trial.
Id. 678-679 (emphasis added).

Hunter cleared any lingering

doubts as to the proper role of the Double Jeopardy Clause where
there is clear legislative intent to provide cumulative
punishment.

Notably, following Huntery the States that have

addressed the same or similar issue now raised by defendant have,
without exception/ found no double jeopardy violation. See e.g.f
State v. MullinS/ 517 N.E.2d 945 (Ohio App. 1986); State v.
Elbert# 512 A.2d 1114 (N.H. 1986); Nevada Department of Prisons
v. Bowen# 103 Nev. 477/ 745 P.2d 697 (1987); Jordan v.
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